source: WOLA
Honduras is entering a new political phase marked by a fragile transition of power, a deep crisis of confidence in the political-electoral system, and a governance scenario conditioned by the balance of power in the National Congress. Nasry “Tito” Asfura’s victory in the presidential election came by a very narrow margin (40.26%) over Salvador Nasralla (39.55%) and followed an electoral process widely questioned for institutional and technical-legal irregularities, leaving the incoming government with low legitimacy.
For the Trump administration, Honduras is a key partner on migration, regional security, and geopolitical alignments, especially after the president’s personal endorsement of Asfura. However, the combination of structural impunity, institutional capture, prioritization of private interests, and weakening of civic space poses significant risks to the country’s governance and democracy.
I. Xiomara Castro’s legacy: progress and shortcomings
Xiomara Castro’s government left a mixed legacy, marked by some progress in social investment and the recovery of the public sector, but also by the inability, or lack of political will, to dismantle the structures that have long sustained corruption and impunity in Honduras.
During her administration, social and political polarization deepened, in part due to her open support for authoritarian regimes in the region. Castro publicly expressed her solidarity with Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro and gave recognition to Nicaraguan President Daniel Ortega “for his support for democracy and the Honduran people’s resistance to the 2009 coup d’état.” On numerous occasions, she expressed her full support for Cuba and condemned the embargo in various multilateral forums.
In contrast, her relationship with the United States was complex and fluctuating during the Biden and Trump administrations. In 2025, cuts to financial assistance and USAID’s departure had a major impact on governance, justice, and human rights projects; however, there were significant agreements on migration, such as accepting an asylum cooperation agreement, and cooperation in border security and defense. Thus, Castro’s foreign policy was marked by a difficult balance between pragmatic cooperation with the United States and ideological rhetoric of solidarity with authoritarian leftist governments.
On the other hand, unlike previous administrations, Castro’s government visibly increased social investment and funding for public infrastructure, including roads, hospitals, schools, and economic support programs for vulnerable sectors. It also showed openness to international organizations for the protection of human rights, among others. However, Xiomara Castro’s government failed, and in some cases did not attempt to transform the inherited power structures from the previous administrations. For example, despite initial political legitimacy and clear social demand, the government kept the inherited electoral architecture intact, which led directly to the current post-election crisis.
Likewise, the failure to establish an International Commission against Impunity (CICIH) with the support of the United Nations, despite this being one of her promises before assuming the presidency, is one of her main shortcomings. Added to this is the lack of action against cases of corruption within the LIBRE party itself during her presidency.
While her discourse emphasized progress on an environmental, agrarian, and human rights agenda, land conflicts persisted (approximately 40) and, in some cases, worsened. No progress was made on land reforms – the Escazú Agreement was not ratified, and key rulings of the Inter-American Court, especially in favor of the Garifuna people, were not complied with.
This left Indigenous and Garifuna peoples in a vulnerable position vis-à-vis the new government.
In terms of security, from December 2022 to January 26, 2026, the Castro government implemented a state of emergency suspending constitutional guarantees, modeling itself on Bukele’s punitive policies in El Salvador. For the Trump administration, this measure was effective in attacking “micro-drug trafficking,” but it has also been questioned for violating human rights. The truth is that official figures point to a slight reduction in homicidal violence, especially in urban areas, but with no significant effect on other crimes such as extortion and violence related to organized crime, which remains high in rural areas of the country.
II. A flawed political-electoral system and eroded legitimacy
The recent elections confirmed what many national actors had been warning: the Honduran political-electoral systemneeds profound reforms. Electoral legislation, essentially unchanged since 2004 and further adjusted in 2021, did not guarantee transparency or legal certainty. The partisan management of electoral institutions, the lack of effective resolution of challenges, and doubts about the functioning of the TREP and special counts contributed to a widespread perception of fraud.
Although the process did not lead to widespread violence, the lack of credibility and public confidence is leaving institutions weakened. All political actors, including those who questioned the process, ultimately accepted the election results, not as an expression of democratic legitimacy, but as a pragmatic solution to the risk of ungovernability.
This context severely conditions the transition and limits the new government’s political maneuvering space.
III. The National Party: a legacy of corruption and impunity
One of the main structural challenges for the Asfura government is that it comes to power without a clear break with the legacy of the National Party and its 12 years in power (until 2022). The party has been repeatedly accused of systemic corruption, links to organized crime, and high levels of impunity, with no credible signs of internal cleansing.
The lack of judicial independence, the weakness of the Public Prosecutor’s Office, and the ineffectiveness in investigating high-level corruption networks that have characterized the various governments in power reinforce the perception that political elites continue to operate without facing justice. To regain a minimum level of public and international confidence, the National Party would have to dismantle its own operators of impunity. Without this break, governance will rely more on transactional political agreements than on a solid democratic mandate.
IV. The National Congress: the critical axis of governance
The National Congress will be the main arena for political dispute during this transition. Based on the results, the balance of power is as follows (out of a total of 128 seats):
- National Party (PN): 49 seats
- Liberal Party (PL): 41 seats
- LIBRE: 35 seats
- Other parties: marginal representation
This scenario sets the stage for a highly fragmented Congress, where the National Party could control a simple majority but would need to negotiate with an internally divided Liberal Party to secure qualified majorities.
The Board of Directors of the National Congress
The election of the National Congress Board of Directors will be decisive. It will not only define the legislative agenda, but also the degree of counterweight or subordination to the executive branch. Internal disputes, “mini-fiefdoms” within the Liberal Party, and the logic of negotiated votes anticipate a transactional Congress with low democratic control capacity.
Representation of women
A relevant, albeit insufficient, element is the presence of women in Congress. Preliminary estimates indicate that around 37 women will occupy seats, representing less than a third of the total. Although this figure reflects progress compared to previous decades, it does not guarantee a legislative agenda focused on women’s rights, especially in a context of conservative alliances and regressive agendas.
V. Economic agenda and its risks to human rights
Everything indicates that the new government will prioritize an agenda focused on the private sector, attracting foreign investment, and “business confidence.” The first meetings with business leaders, international financial organizations, and U.S. political actors point to the reactivation of large-scale extractive and agribusiness projects and, possibly, the Special Economic Development Zones (ZEDES), which have been widely criticized for their lack of transparency.
While this agenda may generate short-term economic growth, it significantly increases the risks for human rights defenders, Indigenous peoples, and rural communities in a country with at least dozens of active socio-territorial conflicts and a history of criminalizing social protest.
The absence of effective mechanisms for consultation, environmental protection, and access to justice could lead to greater conflict and a closing of civic space.
VI. Relationship with the United States: clear alignments, hidden costs
On his first tour as president-elect, Asfura visited the United States, where he held meetings with key actors, including Secretary of State Marco Rubio, Ambassador Greer of the Department of Commerce, the IDB, and some Republican congressmen. As a result, the bilateral relationship between Honduras and the United States appears to be fluid and aligned, particularly on the following points:
- Reestablishment of diplomatic relations with Taiwan
- Reinstatement of Honduras to the International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), a World Bank institution that resolves disputes between states and foreign companies/investors through arbitration, and
- Continuing cooperation on security, extradition, and immigration control\
- Reactivation or reconfiguration of the ZEDES
- Maintaining the Palmerola “Soto Cano” military base
These alignments facilitate political and financial support from the U.S., but they are neither neutral nor free. The geopolitical shift, economic dependence, and concessions on investment and security may deepen structural asymmetries without addressing the factors that drive forced migration: corruption, poverty, violence, and impunity.
Recommendations
For the Trump administration, the U.S. Government
- Restore sustained dialogue with civil society, Indigenous and Garifuna peoples, and human rights organizations, not just with executive branch officials.
For the U.S. Congress
- Continue to condition part of financial and security support on verifiable progress in judicial independence, the fight against corruption, and the protection of human rights defenders, journalists, and other actors.
- Support legislative initiatives (such as H.Res.1278 in the US House of Representatives) that affirm the rights of Garifuna peoples, condemn violence against these communities, and call for diplomatic and political action to protect their culture, territory, and human rights.
- Strengthen oversight of the use of cooperation funds for security.
Support international mechanisms against impunity and do not normalize structural corruption for strategic reasons.
- Organize and carry out congressional delegations to engage in multisectoral dialogue, especially with civil society groups and human rights defenders.
- Incorporate human rights, gender, and environmental protection criteria into all bilateral assistance.
Conclusion
Honduras is entering this new political phase without having resolved the structural causes of its democratic crisis. The stability that the new government can offer will be, at best, fragile and conditional. For the United States, including Congress, the challenge is not only to maintain a strategic ally, but also to determine whether this alliance is more about advancing US interests and an anti-rights agenda or about truly laying the foundations for sustainable democratic governance.
